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STILL THEY SAIL 
SHIPBUILDING IN TAMPA DURING WORLD WAR II 
 
By LEWIS N. WYNNE, Ph.D. 
Executive Director 
The Florida Historical Society 
 
When the planes from Vice Admiral Chuichi 
Nagumo’s carriers attacked the American 
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 
1941, the United States was thrust into the 
cauldron of world war. 
 
Subsequent declarations of war by Adolph 
Hitler and Benito Mussolini merely 
confirmed what the American public already 
realized--that they were in a fight for the 
very survival of the world as they knew it. 
 
Paper presented by Dr. Lewis N. Wynne 
before Gulf Coast History and 
Humanities Conference, University of 
South Alabama, Mobile, AL, March 10, 
1989. 
 
ANOTHER SHIP SLIDES DOWN THE WAYS 
…USS MAUNA LOA LAUNCHED APRIL 4, 1943 
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Despite the optimism of some Japanese and 
German militarists over the destruction of 
the Pacific Fleet, other, wiser leaders were 
less enthusiasitic. Fleet Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto, the strategic planner of the Pearl 
Harbor raid, quieted the jubilant voices on 
his staff, noting that only a portion of 
American naval strength had been wiped out 
and warning darker days ahead for Japan, 
since they had only "awakened the sleeping 
giant.”1 
 
Yamamoto's depiction of the United States 
as a sleeping giant was very apt. The 
collapse of the economy in 1929 and the 
hardships of the Depression that followed 
had demoralized the people of the United 
States and had hobbled its industry to the 
point that it appeared to be dead, but the 
reality of the situation was that American 
industry was merely hibernating, awaiting 
some stimulus to bring it to life. Pearl 
Harbor served that purpose. 
 
Tampa, Florida, like hundreds of other small 
cities, had suffered the Depression decade 
fitfully. The city's economy had experienced 
sputters and sparks of revival, but since its 
economy was based primarily on 
agricultural or service industries, Tampa 
found little in the way of continuous pros-
perity. Her port, once a bustling hive of 
activity, was largely stagnant and 
contributed little to prosperity. 
 
After the explosive development boom of 
the 1920s, Tampa had struggled through the 
'30s and experienced only minimal growth. 
Its population had grown slowly during the 
decade, with only 7,000 new persons 
becoming residents of the city. The 6.7% 
change in population growth from 1930 to 
1940 could easily be accounted for by the 
natural increase in a city of that size. For 
Tampa's people, the Depression struck hard. 
The adjusted unemployment rate for white 
males was 10.8%, but that figure almost 
doubled when individuals involved in 
emergency government employment-the 
CCC, WPA and PWA-were counted. For 
nonwhites and women, the rate was even 
higher. With virtually no manufacturing 
base for heavy industry, citizens relied 
heavily on the annual influx of tourists to 
supplement the local economy.2 
 
 
LIGHT AT END OF TUNNEL 
 
There were occasional bright spots in the 
otherwise dismal picture. Tampa 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, in 
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operation since February, 1917, offered 
some hope in 1938 when it borrowed 
$750,000 from the Public Works 
Administration to fund the construction of a 
10,000-ton dry dock. The company’s 
objective was to compete for shipbuilding 
contracts available through the U.S. 
Maritime Commission and authorized by the 
Merchant Marine Act of 
1936.3 
 
The Roosevelt Administration, disturbed by 
the inability of American shipyards to 
compete with foreign yards and aware that 
the clouds of war which had gathered in 
Europe and Asia might soon cover the 
United States, prevailed upon Congress to 
enact this legislation. The purpose of the act 
was to fund the construction of ten merchant 
ships a year for ten years. For American 
shipyards, which had constructed only two 
dry cargo vessels between 1922 and 1935, 
the Merchant Marine Act was a godsend. 
Not only did it provide a market for new 
ships, but it also featured a "no lose" 
cost-plus incentive for builders and 
operators.4 
 
Under the leadership of Ernest Kreher, 
Tampa Shipbuilding secured the PWA loan, 
constructed the dry dock and, in 1939, was 
awarded an $8 million contract for the 
construction of four cargo ships. 
Approximately 2,000 new jobs were created, 
and for the city’s 6,400 unemployed males, 
the company’s success in securing the 
contracts seemed like the answer to their 
prayers. The excitement created by the 
contract award was soon dampened when 
the company announced that after the 
construction of a single ship, the Seawitch, it 
was in serious financial difficulty and might 
not be able to fulfill the remaining 
contracts.5 
 
The inefficient management of the company 
prompted the Maritime Commission and the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which 
had assumed the PWA loan, to look around 
for new owners. In the words of a U.S. 
Accounting Office report in 1942, 
"Kreher…and his associates were competent 
shipbuilders, [but] they were incapable of 
efficiently managing the company's 
finances.”6  The heavy demands for ships 
generated by the war in Europe and the 
realization that the U.S. might soon be 
involved made it imperative to find someone 
new to oversee the administration of the 
company. 
 
Encouraged by the Maritime Commission 
and the RFC, a local financier, George B. 
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Howell of the Exchange National Bank, 
purchased the company for $500 and 
became the sole owner. Along with the 
contracts for three new ships, Howell also 
acquired $47,000 in assets and the almost $1 
million in liabilities. Under Howell’s 
leadership, TASCO, as the new company 
was called, worked to fill the contracts with 
the Maritime Commission. When war came 
in 1941, the new management was in place 
and ready to expand to meet the needs of the 
nation.7 
 
In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, TASCO 
quickly converted its peacetime operations 
to a war footing. Within days, the company 
began to gear up to meet the anticipated 
needs of the Navy and to expand its facilities 
to increase the number of bottoms it could 
handle at once. Change, however, did not 
happen easily. With the shift from peacetime 
production to wartime construction, TASCO 
immediately became embroiled in two major 
controversies. 
 
NO MISDOING 
 
The first centered around the reorganization 
of the company and the purchase of all 
outstanding stock by George B. Howell in 
1940. When Howell had assumed control, 
TASCO had contracts for three cargo 
vessels for the Maritime Commission. 
Immediately after the U.S.’s entry into the 
war, the company had sold these ships, with 
the concurrence of the Commission, to the 
Navy. The transaction, which gave TASCO 
a working capital in excess of $2 million, 
came under the scrutiny of the U.S. 
Accounting Office. After reviewing the 
evidence, the AO charged Howell and 
TASCO with illegally selling the ships and 
with overcharging the Navy to the tune of 
$1.2 million. The controversy dragged on, 
but while bureaucrats and company lawyers 
argued, the yard continued to build new 
ships. Despite the heat surrounding the 
transaction, both the Commission and the 
Navy supported Howell, and he was 
ultimately absolved of any misdoing.8 
 
The second controversy which involved 
TASCO and other shipyards in the state 
stemmed from the efforts of State Attorney 
General J. Tom Watson to have a "closed 
shop" contract between the company and the 
American Federation of Labor declared 
unconstitutional. Watson, a flamboyant at-
torney, had attempted to persuade the State 
Legislature to outlaw the practice in 1941, 
but had been unsuccessful. In June, 1942, 
Watson, using the war emergency as an 
excuse, attacked the union in court. His 
pursuit of this cause also included a round of 
fisticuffs with M. J. Nicholason, the attorney 
for the National Labor Relations Board. 
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Although the courts gave him a technical 
victory and declared the closed shop 
suspended during the duration of the 
emergency, the practice continued 
nevertheless. Watson’s efforts were not 
supported publicly by local leaders, and 
TASCO remained unionized throughout the 
war.9 
 
"WAR WORK" EMPLOYMENT 
 
For Tampans, as for most Americans, the 
war provided a welcomed relief to the 
economic stagnation of the Depression. For 
the next four years, workers of all ages and 
occupations were recruited to provide the 
manpower needed to produce the materiel 
the U.S. and its allies needed. "War work" 
and "war industries" became the single 
largest employers of laborers, as thousands 
of large and small plants sprang into 
existence overnight to meet this need. The 
12.5 million Americans who had suffered 
through the Depression unemployed now 
found themselves being actively recruited to 
fill factory spaces. Older workers, forced 
into retirement during the previous decade, 
were now coaxed back to work for wages 
that were significantly higher than their 
Social Security benefits. TASCO, for 
example, employed a number of workers in 
their sixties and seventies who possessed 
metalworking skills that were considered 
essential. High school and college students 
were encouraged to contribute to the war 
effort by taking part-time jobs. 
 
Perhaps the greatest gains in the labor 
market were made by women, and 
thousands of them took on the roles of 
"Rosie, the Riveter" and "Wanda, the 
Welder." As the demand for soldiers grew, 
women workers became more and more 
essential. Thomas M. Woodward, a member 
of the U.S. Maritime Commission, noted the 
importance of women in the labor force on 
an inspection of the Tampa yards. Citing a 
need for 30,000 additional workers in yards 
along the Gulf of Mexico, Woodward 
offered the observation that "Women seem 
to be the answer, the only one, to the prob-
lem."10 
 
Although TASCO remained the largest 
single employer in Tampa, its ability to 
secure the 16,000 workers it needed by 1943 
was hampered by the construction of a 
second major shipyard in 1942. Citizens of 
the city were delighted with the 
announcement in the Tampa Tribune that a 
private company intended to spend $30 
million to construct a shipyard in Tampa to 
produce 24 unique cargo vessels, financed 
by a U.S. Maritime Commission contract for 
$30 million.11 
 
CONCRETE SHIPS 
 
This project, known as the Hooker’s Point 
Yard, was the creation of Matthew H. 
McCloskey, Junior, a Philadelphia 
construction mogul and a powerful 
Democratic politician. Taking advantage of 
the national shortage of rolled steel, 
McCloskey proposed the use of concrete for 
ship construction. Despite the rather 
lackluster performance of similar ships 
during World War 1, materiel shortages and 
the success of German U-boats dictated 
improvisation. Within weeks of the contract 
award, McCloskey and his staff moved their 
operations to Tampa.12 
 
Hooker’s Point was little more than a sandy 
spit of land jutting into Tampa Bay. For 
McCloskey, however, the site had three 
major advantages. First, it was located 
adjacent to the ship channel in the harbor. 
Second, its nearest neighbor was the Florida 
Portland Cement Company, with a fleet of 
trucks to haul wet concrete. Third, as 
McCloskey explained to the local 
newspaper, "You’ve got to get away from 
frost to pour concrete, and we…can work 
the year around.”13 
 
Before work on the ships could begin, the 
yard had to be constructed from the ground 
up. Administrative buildings, lofts for 
creating forms and patterns, machine shops, 
utility services, service roads and storage 
sheds were necessary to get the operation 
going. The most essential of all, however, 
was the construction of basins to house the 
ships as they were being built. Unlike 
conventional shipyards which constructed 
ships on land and launched them into the 
water, the Hooker's Point Yard built three 
concrete-lined basins, 1,200 feet long, 27 
feet deep and 82 feet wide, which were 
connected to the Bay by huge doors. In each 
basin, three of the 360-feet-long ships were 
built simultaneously. Launching was simply 
a matter of opening the doors and letting the 
water in.14 
 
HOUSING SHORTAGE 
 
McCloskey's experiment with concrete ships 
opened 6,000 new jobs in Tampa, and the 
expansion of a third shipbuilding facility, 
Tampa Marine Company, also increased the 
demand for workers. Despite the high rate of 
unemployment in 1940, Tampa could not 
supply the labor needs of these facilities, and 
company officials instituted a statewide 
recruitment program. When these efforts did 
not produce enough workers, the campaign 
was expanded into a nationwide effort. 
 
The campaign to attract workers was never 
totally effective, and the Tampa shipyards, 
as well as other industries, attempted to 
offset the lack of workers by extending the 
work week from 40 to 48 hours. Wages 
were constantly increased, and appeals made 
to operators of nonessential industries to 
release workers for war industries. The cigar 
industry, Tampa's largest employer prior to 
World War 11, lost 2,000 skilled workers by 
mid-1943, and the process of attrition 
continued until the end of the conflict.15  No 
doubt this loss of laborers contributed to the 
decline and rapid mechanization of the cigar 
industry in the postwar period. 
 
Tampa's rise as a center of shipbuilding in 
south Florida, coupled with the development 
of Hillsborough County as a center for 
training bomber crews, presented the city 
leaders with a myriad of problems. As the 
thousands of workers arrived in the city, 
officials were hard-pressed to find sufficient 
housing. The housing shortage became even 
more critical as the military opened new 
base ' s to train recruits. MacDill Field, 
Drew Field and Henderson. Field were train-
ing centers for bomb crews of the Army Air 
Force. Pinellas County, across the Bay from 
Tampa, also attracted minor military 
establishments, and added to the problem. 
Despite the wartime restrictions on gasoline, 
snowbirds insisted on making their annual 
trek south and further complicated the 
situation.16 
 
OPA MONITORS PRICES 
 
City leaders were hard-pressed to meet the 
needs of the sudden influx of war workers. 
In order to accommodate the infrastructure 
needs for the expansion of the TASCO 
facility and the new Hooker's Point Yard, 
they asked for and received huge loans from 
various government agencies. Public 
transportation routes were rearranged and 
new routes were added to ensure that 
workers could reach the yards from almost 
any point in town. Hours of operation were 
expanded in order to serve the late night and 
early morning shifts. Additional vehicles 
were added to transport workers forced to 
live as far away from the city as 50 miles.17 
 
Officials with the Tampa branch of the 
Office of Price Administration closely 
monitored the prices of gasoline vendors, 
and were equally as diligent policing the 
claims of workers in car pools for extra gas 
and tire rations. Violators were charged, 
prosecuted and punished. The OPA also 
closely monitored the practices of local 
merchants, and hoarders and speculators 
were quickly dealt with.18 
 
Perhaps the most difficult task faced by 
local authorities was in satisfying the 
demand for afforable housing. As the yards 
expanded their labor forces, workers found 
it difficult to find housing for themselves 
and their families. Patriotic appeals were 
frequently made in the newspapers asking 
home owners to rent every available 
apartment or room to house these new 
arrivals. To ensure that workers were not 
being gouged by greedy landlords, the 
Office of Rent Control periodically 
published lists of acceptable rents 
established by federal regulations, and just 
as periodically, the ORC sent inspectors into 
the field to ensure that no gouging took 
place.19 
 
TRAILER FACILITIES 
 
Despite the best efforts of the ORC and local 
officials, the demand for housing exceeded 
space available. A variety of plans were put 
forth, including one that called for the city to 
turn vacant factory buildings into 
apartments. Although the plan seemed 
worthwhile, it was quickly abandoned 
because the cost of renovations was greater 
than that of all new construction. Other 
solutions had to be found.20 
 
The city fathers, led by Mayor Robert E. Lee 
Chancey, quickly took other steps to resolve 
the problems. On the same day the Tampa 
Tribune reported the decision to forego the 
renovation of old factories, the City Council 
voted to lease 12 acres of the Municipal 
Trailer Park to serve as a park for 400 two- 
and three-bedroom trailers for workers and 
their families. Rather primitive, the trailers 
had no bathrooms or laundry facilities, and 
occupants were forced to use a communal 
building for this purpose. Despite the critical 
shortage of housing and the relatively low 
rent [$28 a month for a two-bedroom unit 
and $32 for a three-bedroom one], the trailer 
park proved unpopular and never operated at 
full capacity.21 
 
For workers at the new Hooker’s Point 
facility, the Maritime Commission 
constructed 600 housing units adjacent to 
the yard. The project, known as Maritime 
GEORGE M. STEINBRENNER III 
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Homes, represented a considerable 
improvement over the trailers. Each unit 
included its own bathroom, hot water heater 
and refrigerator. The project also included a 
grocery store, beauty shop, barber shop and 
theater. Restricted to McCloskey workers, 
the rental prices were only slightly higher 
than those charged for municipal trailers.22 
 
RACE RELATIONS PLACID 
 
Negroes in Tampa also benefitted from the 
housing shortage when the city government 
and the Federal Public Housing Authority 
decided in 1943 to spend $2.3 million to 
construct 500 low-cost concrete block 
homes. Justified as a war emergency 
measure to provide housing for essential 
shipyard workers, the project was located 
"in the heart of the largest Negro section in 
Tampa, and [was] . . . well served by 
electricity, water, transportation and Negro 
schools." The original plans were modified 
and the number of units reduced when 
Tampa aldermen "asked that three of the big 
apartment buildings that would have come 
within 500 feet of Ponce de Leon courts, [a] 
white development, be eliminated.23  Even 
the desperate need for emergency housing 
was not a sufficient cause to suspend the 
rituals of segregation. 
 
All in all, however, race relations in Tampa 
were placid during the war. Although some 
Negroes were hired in the shipyards, war 
industries, with their higher wages and 
strong unions, remained largely a white 
preserve. A survey of the Tampa Tribune for 
the years 1940-1946 reveals only one issue 
that carried any mention of black shipyard 
workers, and that issue pictured them sifting 
through a trash pile to retrieve scrap metal 
for reuse.24 The caption to the only picture 
of black workers in the extant copies of the 
Hooker’s Point Log, the McCloskey 
company newspaper, identified the white 
workers, but did not mention any of the 
Negroes.25 
 
White women, on the other hand, were 
welcomed as workers. Women joined the 
work force at the shipyards within a few 
months of the declaration of war. Although 
the initial groups of women were used in 
office positions or in "soft" jobs like drafting 
or driving, this quickly changed as 
manpower became more scarce. Quick to 
admit that “women aren't naturally 
mechanically inclined," the first female 
office workers nonetheless insisted that they 
were 11 equally as capable as men.”26  As 
the need for additional laborers became 
more acute, women moved out of the offices 
and into the yards. 
 
FIRST FEMALE IN UNION 
 
On July 28, 1942, a month after the first 
Tribune article about female workers, the 
newspaper ran a front page story about Mrs. 
Alma Brown, the first female member of 
"the ultra-conservative local No. 432 of the 
Boilermakers' union, as hard-boiled an outfit 
as ever pushed a ship into the sea," and the 
first woman welder to join the TASCO 
assembly line. Brown, the product of a 
10-week welding course at a local 
vocational school, entered the yard as a 
probationary trainee, but her immediate 
supervisor expected little difficulty in 
having a woman on the job. "Sure, she'll get 
along all right," he said, "She's a little bit of 
a curiosity now to the boys, but when we get 
five or six more the curiosity will wear 
off.”27 
 
So critical was the need for additional 
workers by mid-1942, local unions, caught 
between their desire to maintain control of 
skilled laborers and the government's de-
mand for more productivity, led the way in 
admitting women members. Tampa Local 
432 of the International Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers admitted Alma Brown to 
membership weeks before the national 
leadership submitted the issue to a vote from 
the general membership. In this way, the 
62-year-old prohibition against female 
members fell by the wayside, and the union 
leadership found itself rushing to keep pace 
with its locals.28 
 
By 1943, women welders had become so 
commonplace in both the TASCO and 
Hooker’s Point yards that they received little 
extra attention. By 1944, enough women 
were employed in the Hooker’s Point facility 
that the company could hold a yardwide 
contest to select the best female welder and 
sponsor her in competition with other yards 
operating in the eastern United States.29 
 
OLDER WORKERS ENLISTED 
 
Older males found work in Tampa shipyards 
as well. TASCO actively sought older men 
with metalworking skills and brought them 
into its yard. The oldest worker employed by 
TASCO was 77 years old in 1943. J.M. 
Hutchins had entered the blacksmithing 
trade in 1908, had worked in the Mobile and 
Pensacola shipyards during World War I and 
worked at full shift at TASCO. Hutchins 
was joined by others who were advanced in 
age: W. M. Lovelace, 75 years old; R. F. 
Roberts, 66 years old; and E. L. Broadway, 
66. 
 
The special skills these men possessed were 
critical to the production of steel ships, and 
they were recruited to work. 
 
"They’re men who were doing this kind of 
work before many of us were born," said 
Carl Froehiking, the shop supervisor. "That 
many years of experience is something that 
can’t be replaced by any other kind of 
training. Besides, in times like these, we 
need all the men we can get to keep the iron 
hot."30 
 
A temporary subculture developed around 
the yards, and company officials supported a 
variety of recreational and cultural activities 
for their workers. McCloskey’s Hooker’s 
Point facility printed a bi-weekly newspaper, 
supported various sports programs, provided 
after-work social programs and generally 
maintained a paternalistic attitude toward its 
workers. The construction of housing 
projects for war workers only tended to 
promote the concept of separation from the 
native population of Tampa. Although no 
copies of company newspapers from the 
TASCO yard have been located, references 
to that yard and smaller yards in the area 
indicate that a great deal of intercourse took 
place between the workers of different 
companies.31 
 
"NEW SOUTH" CITY 
 
Workers were not free to move from yard to 
yard, however. Wartime job assignments, 
regulated by the federal Manpower 
Administration, prohibited workers from 
capriciously seeking new positions. Hanging 
over the head of all male workers was the 
threat of losing their critical job rating and 
having to enter the draft. The threat of 
military service did not prevent workers 
from voicing their dissatisfaction from time 
to time, and all the Tampa yards experienced 
work stoppages and walkouts from time to 
time. Absenteeism was an early problem for 
yard administrators, and remained so during 
the entire war period.32 
The impact of the war industries on Tampa 
was revolutionary, particularly in motivating 
the business and civic leadership of the city. 
For them, the industrial development 
brought by the war and the economic 
benefits created by the construction of 
military bases demonstrated the viability of 
Tampa as a "New South" city. 
 
The rapid industrialization of the Tampa 
area also forced local leaders to modify their 
stance on unionization and the rights of 
laborers. Tampa’s reputation as a center of 
antiunion feeling before the war had focused 
national attention on the city, but this 
sentiment was quickly suppressed when the 
prospect of millions of dollars in 
government contracts loomed before them. 
Of course, much of the community ac-
ceptance of unions stemmed from the nature 
of the shipyard work. Although TASCO was 
operated by a local businessman, George B. 
Howell, the Navy Department, adhering to 
the pro-labor legislation of the New Deal, 
mandated the use of union labor. Howell and 
other local leaders had no choice but to 
accept this mandate. Hooker’s Point Yard, 
owned by northerner McCloskey, also 
depended on government contracts, and 
local sentiment played no part in its decision 
to recognize the right of unions. The 
conversion of prominent Floridians to the 
labor point of view was temporary at best, 
and the state adopted a "right to work" con-
stitutional amendment in 1944.33 
 
The influx of nearly 31,000 new workers 
and their families dramatically altered the 
economy of the city, and changed it from a 
sonambulent semi-rural city with a primarily 
agricultural and semiskilled labor base into 
an aggressive forward-looking city seeking 
to retain and expand its wartime supply of 
skilled labor. As early as February 1942, 
Tampa newspapers were speculating as to 
what Tampa’s future would be after the war. 
By 1943, corporate leaders at TASCO, 
Hooker’s Point and the smaller yards in the 
area were focusing a portion of their time 
and resources on postwar industrial pursuits. 
 
George B. Howell and the TASCO yard 
management team inaugurated a program to 
design, build and test semitrailers for use by 
trucking companies in the postwar period. 
Matt McCloskey, the owner of the Hooker’s 
Point Yard, also invested time, money and 
manpower in identifying and developing 
postwar products. Civic leaders promoted 
the concept of a new industrially-based 
economy for the postwar years, and the 
diversity of these ideas indicated that most 
Tampans were no longer willing to return to 
the prewar reliance on tourism, cigars and 
agriculture. They wanted more.34 
 
The productive capacity and engineering 
innovations of Tampa yards gave every 
indication that the possibility of maintaining 
a postwar heavy industry base was very real. 
Matt McCloskey’s Hooker’s Point Yard 
astonished the shipbuilding world by 
devising new construction techniques in its 
use of reinforced concrete to build cargo 
vessels. 
 
SECONDARY INDUSTRY 
 
Although some concrete ships had been built 
during World War 1, these ships had proved 
to be fragile and unreliable. Hooker’s Point 
Yard, using continuous pours made possible 
by new vacuum pumps and mobile mixers 
mounted on trucks, applied many of the 
techniques used in constructing high-rise 
buildings. When engineers determined that a 
lighter weight concrete was needed, 
McCloskey employees identified "Fuller’s 
earth" as a substitute for the heavier sand 
traditionally used. A secondary industry 
developed around the mining of this 
material, and the McCloskey company 
purchased deposits and opened their own 
mining operation.35 
 
Concrete ships built by the Hooker’s Point 
Yard provided a viable alternative to steel 
ships, and when the nation’s steel output 
failed to keep pace with demands during the 
early years of the war, these ships helped 
meet the need for new vessels. Unlike their 
World War I counterparts, the McCloskey 
ships performed very well. Powered by 
3,500 h.p. reciprocal engines, the "floating 
skyscrapers" weathered hurricanes, 
submarine attacks and hard use. Individuals 
who served on the concrete ships were most 
complimentary of their stability, durability 
and overall seaworthiness. McCloskey’s 
continued development of this method of 
shipbuilding was brought to an end when 
supplies of steel improved. 
 
Although revolutionary in design and 
relatively inexpensive to produce, the major 
criticism of the concrete vessels was the 
length of time needed to produce them. In an 
era when Henry J. Kaiser was producing a 
550-foot "Victory" ship every ten days, the 
three to six weeks needed to produce the 
smaller concrete ship could not be justified.  
Although some experiments were 
undertaken to speed up the "curing" time for 
the wet concrete, no significant reduction 
was ever achieved. No longer concerned 
about materiel shortages, the Maritime 
Commission ended the concrete ship 
experiment, and in 1944, the Hooker’s Point 
facility joined the rest of the nation’s yards 
and began to construct steel ships of the 
N-3, coastal cargo freighter variety.36 
 
TASCO STAYS LEADER 
 
Tampa Marine Company, another yard 
along the Ybor Channel of Tampa Bay, also 
contributed to the city’s war economy. 
Employing only 200 prewar workers, this 
yard expanded its capacity significantly 
during the war years, and between 1942 and 
1945, it produced 95 oceangoing tugs. 
Bushnell-Lyons, another small company, 
produced steel barges for the Navy. Perhaps 
the most noteworthy accomplishments of 
these yards came from the diversity of ships 
that were produced.37 
 
Despite the productivity of Hooker’s Point, 
Tampa Marine Company and 
Bushnell-Lyons, the combination of these 
yards could not match the productivity of 
the TASCO yard. Operated under contract to 
the Navy, TASCO produced an amazing 
variety of naval vessels, ranging from the 
10,000 ton destroyer tenders, Piedmont, 
Sierra, and Yosemite, to seven ammunition 
carriers in the Mazama and Mauna Loa 
class. In addition to these large supply ships, 
TASCO also produced 24 coastal 
minesweepers in the Auk and Admirable 
classes, 12 destroyer escorts, as well as a 
number of self-contained "barracks" barges, 
repair vessels and cargo ships. 
 
Including repairs made to ships damaged by 
enemy vessels and conversions made to 
existing ships, TASCO processed a total of 
494 vessels. Its employees received approx-
imately $105 million in wages and salaries, 
most of which remained in the Tampa 
economy. In addition, the company either 
trained or paid for the training of a large 
number of Tampa residents in the skilled 
machine trades.38  The full extent of the 
yard’s production was a closely guarded 
secret during the war, and Navy personnel 
maintained a close watch over the facility. 
The Tampa Tribune made note of the 
secrecy imposed by the Navy when it 
announced on July 1, 1945: "Navy Takes 
Lid Off Tampa Shipyards.”39 
 
 
END COMES SUDDENLY 
 
The economic boom created by the entry of 
the U.S. into World War 11 ended suddenly 
for Tampans. With the Allied victory in 
Europe in April, 1945, and the detonation of 
the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki on August 6 and 7, the need for 
more ships suddenly ceased. By August 12, 
despite the absence of a formal surrender by 
Japan, both the Navy and Maritime 
Commission cut back their orders for ships. 
Two days later, TASCO announced a 
reduction of its labor force by 2,000 
workers. On August 17, McCloskey’s 
Hooker’s Point Yard announced the loss of 
its contracts. In rapid succession, the Tampa 
Tribune announced one layoff after another. 
The phaseout was not a gradual process, and 
layoffs were frequently for thousands of 
workers at a time.40 
 
By December, 1945, the Hooker’s Point 
Yard was closed permanently, and little 
war-related activity was going on at TASCO 
or Tampa Marine. Both companies had 
returned to peacetime production, and the 
strategic planning for the postwar period 
allowed them to continue operations, 
although at a reduced level. 
 
George B. Howell, the dominant force 
behind TASCO, resigned the presidency of 
the company and returned to the banking 
business. Matt McCloskey, the developer of 
Hooker’s Point, now shifted his attention 
once again to traditional construction 
enterprises, although he did purchase an 
interest in a Jacksonville shipbuilding 
company. For the residents of Tampa, the 
end of the war did not mean an end to the 
industrial dreams spurred by the war. For the 
next 20 years, various attempts would be 
made to keep Tampa shipyards in operation. 
The irony is that the Japanese, whose defeat 
was engineered in part by Tampa workers, 
would now prove to be too strong as 
competitors for this industry.41 
 
"RIGHT TO WORK" 
 
For Attorney General J. Tom Watson, the 
end of the war was a signal to renew his 
attacks on organized labor. Within days of 
the beginning of layoffs by Tampa 
shipyards, he announced his intention to 
enforce the "right to work" amendment to 
the state’s constitution.42 
 
There is little in Tampa today to remind 
residents of the great flurry of activity that 
was generated by the World War II 
shipyards. Hooker’s Point is gone, replaced 
by other industries. Maritime Homes, the 
large complex erected for war workers, has 
been bulldozed. TASCO has passed through 
several hands and now is known as the 
American Shipbuilding Company, a 
property of New York Yankees owner, 
George Steinbrenner. It is as if some giant 
hand has simply wiped the slate clean, and 
what was isn’t and never will be again.43 
 
Despite the demise of Tampa’s shipyards, 
there are some who remember this great 
adventure fondly. There are also occasional 
flashes from the past when ship names are 
mentioned. Perhaps the greatest tribute to 
the strength and vitality of the shipyards is 
found in a perusal of Jane’s Fighting Ships 
or other ship publications. Here and there, 
the notations appear: "built by Tampa 
Shipbuilding." For most of the ships 
constructed between 1940 to 1946, age and 
modernity have consigned them to 
scrapheaps or reserve fleets, but some, like 
the Sierra and Yosemite, still play an active 
role in today’s Navy. For still others, 
however, postwar existence has meant being 
transferred to foreign countries. Today, 
Tampa-built ships are operated by the navies 
of Taiwan, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Argentina 
and Turkey.  Orphans of the sea, but still 
they sail.44 
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